主讲人：姚加权，暨南大学金融学教授

讲座摘要：Trust between parties should shape contract design: if parties were suspicious about each others’ reaction to unplanned events, they might pay higher negotiation costs to complete contracts ex-ante. Using a unique sample of U.S. consulting contracts, novel text-based-analysis measures of contract completeness, and a negative shock to trust between shareholders/managers (principals) and consultants (agents) staggered across space and over time, we find that lower trust increases contract completeness. Non-competes, details about equity compensation, indemnification, termination, and confidentiality clauses are added to contracts after trust drops.

讲座时间：10月26日（星期四），早上10：00-11：00

讲座地点：学院南路校区主教113研讨教室

主讲人简介：姚加权，暨南大学金融学教授，博导。西安交通大学信息工程学士和理论计量经济学硕士，新加坡南洋理工大学金融学博士，研究方向包括金融科技、数字经济、非结构化大数据计量经济学和自然语言处理，论文发表于Review of Financial Studies、Management Science、Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis、《管理世界》、《管理科学学报》等国内外权威期刊，以及计算机顶会WWW和KDD。担任International Journal of Finance Economics (ABS三星)副主编。指导的学生论文曾获第三届全国优秀金融硕士学位论文。

主办：中国互联网经济研究院

此次讲座获得北京高等学校卓越青年科学家计划资助（BJJWZYJH01201910034034），特此致谢。

撰稿：刘航       排版：王昱洁

初审：孙宝文      复审：王立勇