主讲人：Professor Sabri Boubaker（法国诺曼底商学院）

讲座摘要：Motivated by Hart and Moore (1994)’s theoretical framework on inalienable human capital and debt contracting, we empirically investigate how firms adjust their debt structure in response to increased human capital mobility risk. Exploiting the staggered rejection of the inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD), which potentially facilitates key talent outflows, we find that treated firms exhibit a statistically significant increase in private debt reliance relative to public debt. This result persists across various model specifications and is further corroborated by utilizing state-level noncompete enforceability as alternative proxies for changes in human capital mobility. Cross-sectional analysis suggests that the flexibility in renegotiation and enhanced monitoring associated with private debt provide crucial benefits in managing the heightened risk of human capital loss.

讲座时间：2月29日（星期四），下午2：30-4：00

讲座地点：中财大厦二层案例教室2

主讲人简介：Sabri Boubaker教授是法国诺曼底商学院教授，他的研究领域是公司财务、资本结构、企业社会责任资本预算等。他的研究成果发表在Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal of International Money and Finance 等国际期刊上。目前担任SSCI期刊Journal of International Financial Management&Accounting主编、International Review of Economics and Finance和International Journal of Finance&Economics的副主编。

主办：中国互联网经济研究院

此次讲座获得北京高等学校卓越青年科学家计划资助（BJJWZYJH01201910034034），特此致谢。

撰稿：李东阳      排版：王昱洁

初审：孙宝文      复审：王立勇